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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is a growing unease in space, and on Earth.1 Fueled by rising geo-
political tensions on Earth2 and growing rhetoric on the inevitability of a war 
in space,3 humanity stands at a crucial turning point and a crossroads: Do we 
continue to collectively reap the economic, technological, scientific, social, 
and strategic benefits that space activities and assets have to offer,4 or do we 
choose to weaponize the “ultimate high ground”5 and direct space assets as 
instruments of destruction in ways unimaginable?6 
 
 1 As the U.S. Representative to the First Committee of the General Assembly succinctly 
argued in 1962: 
Outer space is not a new subject, it is just a new place in which all the 
old subjects come up. The things that go on in space are intimately related 
to the things that go on here on earth. It would be naive to suppose that 
we can insulate outer space from other aspects of human existence. 
See Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 57 AM. J. 
OF INT’L L. 403, 429 (1963). 
 2 Among which are tensions in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, the unilateral 
withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (2002) and more recently the events in 
Syria and ongoing trade war between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. 
 3 Stuart Clark, It’s Going to Happen: Is the World Ready for a War in Space?, 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 15, 2018), www.theguardian.com/science/2018/apr/15/its-going-to-happ 
en-is-world-ready-for-war-in-space; see also Steven Freeland, Star Wars: The Battle for 
Laws Against War in Outer Space, AUSTL. INST. INT’L AFF. (Apr. 4, 2018), http://www.inte 
rnationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/star-wars-law-in-outer-space/. 
 4 See Benefits of Space for Humankind, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE 
AFF., https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/benefits-of-space/benefits.html (last visited Feb. 
22, 2020); see generally Jeff Greenblatt & Al Anzaldua, How Space Technology Benefits 
the Earth, SPACE REV. (July 29, 2019), https://www.thespacereview.com/article/3768/1. 
 5 After the launch of Sputnik, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff General Thomas D. White 
was quoted as saying “I feel that in the future whoever has the capability to control space 
will likewise possess the capability to control the surface of the Earth.” ROBERT F. 
FUTRELL, IDEAS, CONCEPTS, DOCTRINE: BASIC THINKING IN THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 
550 (1989). Fast forward to 2019, United States President Trump noted that there are those 
who “seek to challenge [the U.S.] in the ultimate high ground of space.” Remarks by Pres-
ident Trump at Event Establishing the U.S. Space Command, WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 29, 
2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-event- 
establishing-u-s-space-command/. 
 6 Writing already in the early 1980s, Bhupendra Jasani warned that: “The militarization 
of outer space has reached such a level that loss of some or all of a nation’s military space-
craft would reduce considerably the efficiency of that nation’s fighting forces on Earth. 
Therefore war in space would be just an indication of initiation of a war on Earth . . . .” 
See BHUPENDRA JASANI, SPACE: BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE 444 (1982). A space war 
“could very well end with a crippled global economy, inoperable infrastructure, and a 
planet shrouded by the orbiting fragments of pulverized satellites” Garrett M. Graff, The 
New Arms Race Threatening to Explode in Space, WIRED (June 26, 2018), https://www.wir 
ed.com/story/new-arms-race-threatening-to-explode-in-space/. 
2020 NEW WAYS AND MEANS 663 
Space systems perform a myriad of civilian weather monitoring, commu-
nications, navigation, and facilitate the provision of humanitarian and emer-
gency relief efforts.7 The sustainable and responsible use of space is, however, 
increasingly fragile, threatened by intensified research and potential deploy-
ment of a whole host of disabling or destructive ways and means. These range 
from electronic warfare (jamming and spoofing of transmissions), cyber-at-
tacks, directed energy attacks (from the ground, air, sea, or space-based plat-
forms), to orbital-based anti-satellite systems, and ground-based anti-satellite 
weapons.8 
Indeed, high on the agenda at the United Nations (UN) for decades is the 
concern of an arms race in outer space,9 and the placement (and arguably use) 
of weapons in outer space that would pose a “grave danger for international 
peace and security.”10 This Article will provide an overview of adequacy of 
the legal framework in securing the responsible and peaceful use of outer 
space, and long-standing diplomatic efforts to prevent the extension of arms 
into the final frontier. Specifically, it will turn attention to the recently adopted 
UN Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines,11 as well as civil society initiatives, 
such as the McGill Manual on International Law Applicable to Military Uses 
of Outer Space (McGill Manual, or MILAMOS), which aim to increase trans-
parency and strengthen the rule of law in a domain space where scientific, 
economic and strategic interest invariably intercept and intertwine.12 
II. LEGAL REGIME GOVERNING SPACE 
Outer space has never been a lawless domain of human activity, but has 
always been subject to international law.13 As soon as activities of states en-
tered the realm of outer space, the overarching regime of international law that 
 
 7 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Humanitarian Consequences and Constraints Under 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) Related to the Potential Use of Weapons in Outer 
Space, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. GE-PAROS/2019/WP.1 (Mar. 18, 2019). 
 8 U.N. Secretary-General, Group of Governmental Experts on Further Practical 
Measures for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, ¶ 36, U.N. Doc. A/74/77, 
annex II (Apr. 9, 2019). 
 9 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 74/32, Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (Dec. 12, 2019). 
The same resolution has been adopted annually for close to four decades since 1981. 
 10 G.A. Res. 74/34, Further Practical Measures for the Prevention of an Arms Race in 
Outer Space, at pmbl., ¶ 3 (Dec. 12, 2019). 
 11 Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of Work of Its Sixty-Second Ses-
sion, U.N. Doc. A/74/20, at 50–69 (July 3, 2019) [hereinafter Long-Term Sustainability 
Guidelines]. 
 12 For more information on the MILAMOS Project, please visit the dedicated 
MILAMOS website: www.mcgill.ca/milamos/. 
 13 MANFRED LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE: AN EXPERIENCE IN CONTEMPORARY 
LAWMAKING 125 (Tanja Masson-Zwaan & Stephan Hobe eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
2010) (1972) [hereinafter LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE] (reissued on the occasion of 
the 50th anniversary of the International Institute of Space Law). 
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governs the rights and responsibilities of states became automatically appli-
cable.14 These sentiments are reflected in the 1963 Declaration of Legal Prin-
ciples Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space,15 and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty,16 which translated the provisions 
of the 1963 Declaration into a binding multilateral agreement. Article III of 
the Outer Space Treaty underlines that: 
States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the ex-
ploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other 
celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, includ-
ing the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of main-
taining international peace and security and promoting inter-
national co-operation and understanding.17 
That space activities must be conducted in the interest of international 
peace and security traces its origins to the dawn of the Space Age. In 1958, 
almost immediately after the launch of the first artificial satellite Sputnik I, 
the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted the first resolution specifically 
dealing with outer space.18 Recognizing that all humankind, have a “common 
interest” in outer space,19 the Preamble of Resolution 1348 (XIII) underlined 
the importance of avoiding “the extension of present national rivalries into 
this new field.”20 To further “co-operation in the study of outer space for 
peaceful purposes,”21 the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(UNCOPUOS)22 was established as the diplomatic forum to address and adopt 
 
 14 Id. Even before the space era, Oscar Schachter argued that legal principles and prec-
edents which form customary international law are applicable to space activities. Oscar 
Schachter, Who Owns the Universe, in SPACE LAW: A SYMPOSIUM PREPARED AT THE 
REQUEST OF HONORABLE LYNDON B. JOHNSON 8, 14 (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office 1959). 
 15 G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII), Declaration of Legal Principles Concerning the Activities of 
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, ¶¶ 2, 4 (Dec. 13, 1963) [hereinafter 
Declaration of Legal Principles]. 
 16 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 
2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1967) [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. 
 17 Declaration of Legal Principles, supra note 15, at ¶ 4; and Outer Space Treaty, supra 
note 16, at art III. 
 18 G.A. Res. 1348 (XIII), Question of the Peaceful Use of Outer Space (Dec. 13, 1958). 
The first resolution that incidentally alluded to space activities was adopted immediately 
after the launching of Sputnik I, and called for the “joint study of an inspection system 
designed to ensure that the sending of objects through outer space shall be exclusively for 
peaceful and scientific purposes.” See G.A. Res.1148 (XII), ¶ 1(f) (Nov. 14, 1957) (em-
phasis added). 
 19 G.A. Res. 1348 (XIII), supra note 18, at pmbl., ¶ 1. 
 20 Id. at pmbl., ¶ 1. 
 21 Id. at pmbl., ¶ 7. 
 22 Id. at ¶ 1. 
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measures relating to the peaceful use of outer space.23 In the years that fol-
lowed, several treaties24 and resolutions25 adopted by the UNCOPUOS would 
form a body of rules underpinning the global space governance system.26 
The unanimously-adopted 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles resolution 
and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty both recognize in their respective pream-
bles27 “the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration 
and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.”28 The concept of “peaceful 
 
 23 At the time of writing, the UNCOPUOS has grown to assume the role “as a forum for 
fostering dialogue and cooperation among States members of the Committee and organi-
zations with permanent observer status and for strengthening partnerships among States, 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, industry and private sector enti-
ties.” The number of Members States of the Committee has increased from eighteen in 
1958 to ninety-two Member States in 2019. See Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines, su-
pra note 11, at ¶¶ 15–16. 
 24 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 16; Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Re-
turn of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 
19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 (entered into force Dec. 3, 1968) [hereinafter Rescue 
and Return Agreement]; Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by 
Space Objects, Mar 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 (entered into force Sept. 
1, 1972) [hereinafter Liability Convention]: Convention on Registration of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Nov. 12, 1974, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 
U.N.T.S. 15 (entered into force Sept. 15, 1976) [hereinafter Registration Convention]; 
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 
Dec. 5, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 11, 1984) [hereinafter Moon Agree-
ment]. 
 25 They are: Declaration of Legal Principles, supra note 15; G.A. Res. 37/92, Principles 
Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Televi-
sion Broadcasting (Dec. 10, 1982); G.A. Res. 41/65, Principles Relating to Remote Sensing 
of the Earth from Space (Dec. 3, 1986); G.A. Res. 47/68, Principles Relevant to the Use of 
Nuclear Sources in Outer Space (Dec. 14, 1992); G.A. Res. 51/122, Declaration on Inter-
national Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the 
Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries 
(Dec. 13, 1996) [hereinafter Space Benefits Declaration]. 
 26 See RAM JAKHU & JOSEPH PELTON, GLOBAL SPACE GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL 
STUDY (2017); see also G.A. Dec. 2/33, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/116 (Dec. 13, 2017). 
 27 This does raise the issue of whether text in the preamble of an international instrument 
can have binding force. In South West Africa Cases, the ICJ held: 
[T]he preambular parts of the United Nations Charter constitute the 
moral and political basis for the specific legal provisions thereafter set 
out. Such considerations do not, however, in themselves amount to rules 
of law. All States are interested—have an interest—in such matters. But 
the existence of an “interest” does not of itself entail that this interest is 
specifically juridical in character. 
See South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Judgement, 1966 I.C.J. 6, 
¶ 50 (July 18). Even so, the preamble has an important role in the interpretation of treaties. 
See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 
331 [hereinafter Convention on the Law of Treaties or VCLT]. 
 28 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 16, at ¶ 2. Note that the Preamble of Resolution 1348 
(XIII) underlined “the common aim that outer space should be used for peaceful purposes 
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purpose” does not have an authoritative definition and continues to be a source 
of contention.29 What evolved from declarations of spacefaring states and 
state practice, particularly of the former Soviet Union and the United States,30 
is that “peaceful purposes” means that outer space can be used both for civil-
ian and military non-aggressive purposes.31 Thus, as long as space activities, 
including those conducted by the military or are in support of a strategic or 
military activities, are carried out in accordance with international law, in-
cluding the UN Charter, then it is compatible with exploring or using space 
for “peaceful purposes.”32 
 
only.” G.A. Res. 1348 (XIII), supra note 18, at pmbl., ¶ 1 (emphasis added); see also id. at 
pmbl., ¶ 10 (reflecting text of the Antarctic Treaty, which drafted and adopted around the 
same time as the UN resolutions on space were adopted). Thus, Article 1 of the Antarctic 
Treaty reads: 
1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be 
prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as the es-
tablishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of mili-
tary maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons. 
2. The present treaty shall not prevent the use of military personnel or 
equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes. 
Antarctic Treaty art. 1, June 23, 1961, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 (emphasis added). The immediate 
recognition of outer space as an ultimate high ground for military operations would even-
tually weaken the notion that outer space should be explored and used for “peaceful pur-
poses only. See Bin Cheng, Military Use of Outer Space: Article IV of the 1967 Space 
Treaty Revisited, in THE UTILIZATION OF THE WORLD’S AIR SPACE AND FREE OUTER SPACE 
AND FREE OUTER SPACE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 305, 308 (Chia-Jui Cheng & Doo Hwan Kim 
eds., 2000). 
 29 See, e.g., Marko G. Markoff, Disarmament and “Peaceful Purposes” Provisions in 
the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, 4 J. SPACE L. 3 (1976); CARL Q. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 20–25 (Pergamon Press 1982); Ivan A. Vlasic, The 
Legal Aspects of Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, in PEACEFUL AND NON-
PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE: PROBS. OF DEFINITION FOR THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE 
37 (Bhupendra Jasani ed., 1991); Bin Cheng, Definitional Issues in Space Law: The 
‘Peaceful Use’ of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, in STUDIES 
IN INT’L SPACE LAW 281 (1997); Elizabeth S. Waldrop, Weaponization of Outer Space: US 
National Policy, 29 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 329 (2004). 
  Though, Judge Manfred Lachs notes “there seems to be little doubt as to the real 
meaning of [the] words” peaceful purposes, which purport to completely disarm and de-
militarise space. LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, supra note 13, at 97. 
 30 Cheng, supra note 29, at 224–25; see also Vladimir Kopal, Treaty on Principles Gov-
erning the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, U.N. AUDIOVISUAL LIBR. OF INT’L L. 1 (2008), https://leg 
al.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/tos/tos_e.pdf. 
 31 This has been the position of the majority of States. See Carl Q. Christol, The Common 
Interest in the Exploration, Use and Exploitation of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes: 
The Soviet-American Dilemma, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH COLLOQUIUM 
ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE (1985). 
 32 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 16, at art. III. 
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This understanding can be further supported by Article IV of the Outer 
Space Treaty, which provides that the Moon and other celestial bodies must 
be explored and used for “exclusively” peaceful purposes.33 The inclusion of 
the word “exclusive” is clarified as meaning an express prohibition of the “es-
tablishment of military bases, installations and fortifications,” and an unam-
biguous prohibition against “the testing of any type of weapons and the con-
duct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies.” 34 Nevertheless, military 
personnel, equipment, and facilities can be used for scientific research or for 
“peaceful exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies.”35 
Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty specifically prohibits states parties 
from placing “in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons 
or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction” and from installing “such 
weapons on celestial bodies, or station[ing] such weapons in outer space in 
any other manner.”36 This prohibition does not forbid the placement or sta-
tioning of conventional, non-nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruc-
tion.37 
In effect, the Outer Space Treaty does not expressly prohibit military uses 
of outer space per se, and only partially de-weaponizes it in relation to nuclear 
weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, thousands of space objects 
have been, are being, and will no doubt continue to be launched and operated 
for military purposes.38 Even a series of anti-satellite (ASAT) tests carried out 
by the U.S., Russia, China, and, more recently, India have not been con-
demned as contrary to the legal framework governing the use of space for 
peaceful purposes.39 
 
 33 Id. at art IV ¶ 2. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at ¶ 1. 
 37 See Setsuko Aoki, Law and Military Uses of Outer Space, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK 
OF SPACE LAW 197, 201–02 (Ram S. Jakhu & Paul Stephen Dempsey eds., 2017). 
 38 See USC Satellite Database, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, www.ucsusa.org/re-
sources/satellite-database (last visited Dec. 16, 2019). 
 39 Indeed, after the most recent ASAT test in March 2019, the Ministry of External Af-
fairs of India noted that: “India has no intention of entering into an arms race in outer space. 
We have always maintained that space must be used only for peaceful purposes. We are 
against the weaponization of Outer Space and support international efforts to reinforce the 
safety and security of space based assets.” See Frequently Asked Questions on Mission 
Shakti, India’s Anti-Satellite Missile Test Conducted on 27 March, 2019, INDIAN MINISTRY 
OF EXTERNAL AFF. (Mar. 27, 2019), https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/31179/Frequ 
ently+Asked+Questions+on+Mission+Shakti+Indias+AntiSatellite+Missile+test+conduct 
ed+on+27+March+2019. Further, the Ministry noted that: “India is not in violation of any 
international law or Treaty to which it is a Party or any national obligation.” Id.; see also 
Brian Weeden & Victoria Sampson, India’s ASAT Test is Wake-Up Call for Norms of Be-
havior in Space, SPACE NEWS (Apr. 8, 2019), https://spacenews.com/op-ed-indias-asat-test 
-is-wake-up-call-for-norms-of-behavior-in-space/ (“India’s ASAT test is wake-up call for 
norms of behavior in space”). 
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However, unlike under traditional international law—summarized by the 
ruling in the Lotus case, stating that what is not expressly prohibited is per-
mitted—this concept is not strictly applicable to the realm of outer space.40 
Despite the lack of express prohibition of military uses of space, in the global 
commons of outer space, where the shared interests of states prevail over the 
individual interests of any one state, the types of activities and actions in space 
are limited by, e.g., the rights of other states to explore and use space,41 and 
the obligation to conduct activities in outer space “with due regard to the cor-
responding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty.”42 There is also 
the general obligation to conduct space activities “in accordance with interna-
tional law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of main-
taining international peace and security and promoting international co-oper-
ation and understanding,”43 and the legality of military uses will be assessed 
against this criteria. 
III. THE LEGAL LACUNAE WITH REGARD TO RESPONSIBLE AND PEACEFUL 
USE OF OUTER SPACE 
While the space law treaties and other international instruments outline 
fundamental principles governing the exploration and use of outer space, to 
date there is no comprehensive document that lays down the legal parameters 
of the specific types of activities permissible in space. In particular, even 
though many space technologies and assets are inherently tied to military and 
strategic uses of outer space, there is little guidance or consensus on the extent 
to which military space activities are permissible on the spectrum of peace-
time and times of armed conflict. Though there is a right to consult and be 
consulted whenever the space activities of another State in the peaceful ex-
ploration and use of outer space has potential to cause “harmful interrefer-
ence,”44 there is unfortunately no “precise method . . . for determining, in an 
objective way, what constitutes harmful interference . . . .”45 
 
 40 S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgement, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18–19 (Sept. 7); 
see also V.S. VERESHCHETIN, PREVENTION OF THE ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECT, at 10–11, UNIDIR/86/08, U.N. Sales No. GV.86.02 (1986); 
Jonathan F. Galloway, Nuclear Winter, Ballistic Missile Defense, and the Legal Regime 
for Outer Space, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-EIGHT COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF 
OUTER SPACE, supra note 31, at 23; Ram Jakhu, Legal Issues Relating to the Global Public 
Interest in Space Law, 32 J. SPACE L. 31, 41–43 (2006). 
 41 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 16, at art I. 
 42 Id. at art. IX. 
 43 Id. at art. III. 
 44 Id. at art IX. 
 45 Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Survey of the Problem of Discretion 
Exercised by States in Interpreting Basic Legal Principles and Norms Related to Safety and 
Security in Outer Space: Working Paper Submitted by the Russian Federation, ¶ 12, U.N. 
2020 NEW WAYS AND MEANS 669 
Currently, space activities are generally conducted under a legal regime 
“shaped largely by unilateral interpretation of general principles combined 
with informal rules of the road.”46 Though, to date, states have exercised re-
straint in outer space and not allowed instances of interference to escalate, 
“self-restraint is no substitute for effective governance mechanisms, codified 
in international law, especially when tensions are running high.”47 As the Rus-
sian Federation recently forewarned: “The very impossibility, due to objective 
reasons, to reach the clear definition of a hostile intent, especially as applied 
to outer space, may only lead to unprecedented subjectivity in interpretations 
and, hence, a dramatic increase in the probability of conflicts.”48 
Indeed, in what has been labelled as the highly “congested, contested and 
competitive” domain of activities,49 various aspects of space operations can 
suffer interference, or be interfered with, whether unintentionally or intention-
ally. Such interference may be through electromagnetic means, or: 
[C]aused as a result of the following: experiments providing 
for a considerable alteration of the natural conditions of the 
space environment; operations influencing the function of 
equipment aboard space objects (for example, blocking or lim-
iting the field of view of on-board optical or radio equipment); 
inspection operations which may lead to the threat of collision 
of space objects under the jurisdiction and control of different 
States; and operations providing for a non-coordinated physi-
cal contact of a space object under the jurisdiction and control 
of one State with a space object under the jurisdiction and con-
trol of another State.50 
 
Doc. A/AC.105/2018/CRP.17 (June 21, 2018) [hereinafter Survey of the Problem of Dis-
cretion]. 
 46 Nina Tannenwald, Law Versus Power on the High Frontier: The Case for a Rule-
Based Regime for Outer Space, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 363, 378 (2004); see also Survey of 
the Problem of Discretion, supra note 45, at ¶ 1. 
 47 First Comm. of the U.N. G.A. – Disarmament and International Security, Civil Soci-
ety Statement on Outer Space Security, delivered by Cesar Jaramillo, Project Ploughshares, 
(Oct. 16, 2015), http://ploughshares.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/OuterSpace-1stCom- 
2015.pdf. 
 48 Survey of the Problem of Discretion, supra note 45, at ¶ 20. 
 49 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, NAT’L SEC. SPACE 
STRATEGY: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY 1 (2011), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/News 
room/Reports%20and%20Pubs/2011_nationalsecurityspacestrategy.pdf; see also 
RAJESWARI PILLAI RAJAGOPALAN, PROJECT PLOUGHSARES, OUTER SPACE: CROWDED, 
CONGESTED, AND CONTESTED (2018), https://www.ploughshares.ca/pl_publications/outer- 
space-crowded-congested-and-contested. 
 50 See Survey of the Problem of Discretion, supra note 45, at ¶ 22; see generally SPACE 
SECURITY INDEX 2019 (Jessica West ed., 16th ed. 2019) (providing context and annual 
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While harmful interference has been defined in the telecommunications 
context as “[i]nterference which endangers the functioning of a radionaviga-
tion service or of other safety services or seriously degrades, obstructs or re-
peatedly interrupts a radiocommunication service,”51 there are no objective 
standards as to what can be deemed to constitute endangering the functions of 
a space object, or what threshold must be reached to qualify as “seriously” 
degrading, obstructing, or repeatedly interrupting communications. Similarly, 
with the growing ability to conduct rendezvous and proximity operations 
(RPOs), which may be instrumental for debris mitigation operations,52 there 
is also unease as to whether such operation may be interpreted as a threat or 
use of force.53 
IV. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE RESPONSIBLE AND 
PEACEFUL USE OF SPACE 
Despite commending the Outer Space Treaty for identifying common in-
terests and concerns and capturing them “in a mutually acceptable legal in-
strument”54 concluded in “remarkably short time,”55 then-U.S. Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk noted that “[t]he treaty is not complete in all possible de-
tails,” and “does not deal with all problems that may develop.”56 
Five decades on, considering the continuing “fragility of the space envi-
ronment and the challenges to the long-term sustainability of outer space 
 
updates on seventeen indicators of space security); Global Counterspace Capabilities: An 
Open Source Assessment (Brian Weeden & Victoria Sampson eds., 2019), swfound.org/me 
dia/206408/swf_global_counterspace_april2019_web.pdf (providing assessments of many 
national programs related to space defense). 
 51 Int’l Telecomm. Union [ITU], Radio Regulations, art. 1.169 (2016). States must es-
tablish and operate their communications (including through space-based means) in “such 
a manner as not to cause harmful interference” of other States. States need only establish 
and operate their communications (including through space-based means) in “such a man-
ner as not to cause harmful interference” of other States. Id. at § 0.4; accord Constitution 
of the International Telecommunication Union art. 45, Dec. 22, 1992, T.I.A.S. 97-1026, 
1825 U.N.T.S. 361. 
 52 See Writing the Rules on Close-Proximity Orbital Operations, EUROPEAN SPACE 
AGENCY (July 8, 2019), blogs.esa.int/cleanspace/2019/07/08/writing-the-rules-on-close-pr 
oximity-orbital-operations. 
 53 See, e.g., Brian Weeden, Dir. of Program Planning, Secure World Found., The Evo-
lution of Space Rendezvous and Proximity Operations and Implications for Space Security, 
Presentation at the U.N. Disarmament Conference (Apr. 12, 2019), https://unidir.org/sites/ 
default/files/2019-12/Brian%20WEEDEN%20 %20UNDCRPOApr2019.pdf. 
 54 Treaty on Outer Space: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th 
Cong. 2 (1967) (statement of Hon. Dean Rusk, Sec’y of State); see also id. at 3 (“The 
standards developed in the Outer Space Treaty represent a balance of rights and obligations 
between nations who are conducting space activities and those who do not.”). 
 55 Id. at 2. 
 56 Id. at 4. 
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activities,”57 there are obvious gaps “in the binding legal framework on outer 
space brought about as a result of the continuous evolution of space technol-
ogy.”58 Though the space law treaties and resolutions provide a “sound and 
basic framework for outer space activities,”59 since the adoption of the Moon 
Agreement in 197960 there has been little appetite in the diplomatic arena for 
the adoption of a new binding instrument dealing with activities in outer 
space.61 In particular, there is a risk of “misperception, misinformation, mis-
understanding and miscalculation arising from military activities in outer 
space,”62 and as a result “preventing conflicts in outer space and preserving 
outer space for peaceful purposes ha[s] become more relevant than ever.”63 
Though States have acted with much restraint in outer space and largely 
maintained the exploration and use of space for “peaceful purposes,”64 brew-
ing earthly tensions and the “serious legal deficit”65 in concrete instruments 
to restrict, let alone prohibit, the weaponization of and/or extension of armed 
conflict into outer space may result in a situation where space itself becomes 
the very theater of war. The Russian Federation voiced urgent concerns about 
unilateral interpretations of “principles and norms of international law per-
taining to safety and security in outer space,”66 particularly in a domain where 
concepts such as what constitute “harmful interference” are ill-defined and 
 
 57 G.A. Res. 73/91, International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, ¶ 8 
(Dec. 18, 2018) [hereinafter ICPUOS]. 
 58 Long Term Sustainability Guidelines, supra note 11, at ¶ 199. 
 59 Id. at ¶ 197. 
 60 Though the space law treaties and resolutions provide a “sound and basic framework 
for outer space activities,” since the adoption of the Moon Agreement in 1979, there has 
been little appetite in the diplomatic arena . . . .” See Moon Agreement, supra note 24, at 
3. 
 61 The Moon Agreement was the last treaty dealing with activities in space to be adopted. 
See Moon Agreement, supra note 24, at 3. The most recent treaty to be proposed failed to 
gain international support. See Letter dated Feb. 12, 2008 from the Permanent Representa-
tive of the Russian Federation and the Permanent Representative of China to the Confer-
ence on Disarmament addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference Transmitting 
the Russian and Chinese Texts of the Draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weap-
ons in Outer Space and of the Threat or use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), 
U.N. Doc. CD/1839 (Feb. 29, 2008) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. CD/1839 ]; Meetings Cover-
age, Raising Alarm over Possible Space Wars, First Committee Delegates Explore Ways 
to Build New Order for Preventing Celestial Conflict, Confrontation, GA/DIS/3609 (Oct. 
24, 2018), https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/gadis3609.doc.htm. 
 62 Long Term Sustainability Guidelines, supra note 11, at ¶ 49. 
 63 Id. at ¶ 51. 
 64 Tannenwald, supra note 46, at 409. 
 65 Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto & Steven Freeland, From Star Wars to Space Wars—The 
Next Strategic Frontier: Paradigms to Anchor Space Security, 33 J. AIR & SPACE L. 10, 36 
(2008). 
 66 Survey of the Problem of Discretion, supra note 45, at ¶ 1. 
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may lead to “conflict and near-to-conflict situations in outer space.”67 What is 
needed is a better awareness of the nature, positions, and trajectories space 
objects and activities in outer space,68 as well as clearer standards and agreed 
set of rules on launch, on-orbit operations, and post-mission disposal of space 
objects to increase overall transparency, as well as to prevent and diffuse pos-
sible escalating tensions in space.69 
To date, attempts at addressing the wider issue of military uses of space 
and space security have included a U.N. General Assembly resolution aimed 
at deterring an arms race in outer space,70 a proposed Sino-Russian treaty 
aimed at the prevention of the placement of weapons and prohibiting the threat 
or use of force in space,71 the development of transparency and confidence-
building measures (TCBMs) relating to space activities,72 and attempts to clar-
ify norms of behaviour in space.73 Further, joint ad hoc meetings of the First 
(Disarmament and International Security) and Fourth (Special Political and 
Decolonization) Committees of the UN General Assembly were convened in 
2015 and 2017 with the aim of addressing “possible challenges to space secu-
rity and sustainability,”74 and a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) was 
established to consider practical measures for the prevention of an arms race 
in outer space and to “make recommendations on substantial elements of an 
 
 67 Id. at ¶¶ 6, 12 (“Finding a precise method to be used for determining, in an objective 
way, what constitutes harmful interference does not seem a fairly easy thing to do.”) 
 68 This can be encapsulated under the concept of “space situational awareness” and cor-
ollary concept of space traffic management. See SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION, SPACE 
SUSTAINABILITY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 16–17 (2018), swfound.org/media/206407/swf_spac 
e_sustainability_booklet_2018_web.pdf. 
 69 Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines, supra note 11, at ¶ 49. 
 70 G.A. Res. 74/32, supra note 9. 
 71 U.N. Doc. CD/1839, supra note 61; see also G.A. Res. 74/34, No First Placement of 
Weapons in Outer Space (2019). 
 72 See U.N. Secretary General, Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and 
Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities, U.N. Doc. A/68/189 (July 29, 
2013). For the latest UNGA resolution, see G.A. Res.74/67, Transparency and Confidence-
Building Measures in Outer Space Activities (Dec. 12, 2019). 
 73 EU Proposal for an International Space Code of Conduct, Draft, EUROPEAN UNION 
EXTERNAL ACTION (Mar. 31, 2014), www.eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmam 
ent/pdf/space_code_conduct_draft_vers_31-march-2014_en.pdf. 
 74 Press Release, Gen. Assembly, As Fourth, First Committees Hold Joint Meeting, 
Speakers Stress Need for Holistic Handling of Outer Space Security, Sustainability, U.N. 
Press Release GA/DIS/3531 (Oct. 22, 2015); Press Release, Gen. Assembly, Raising 
Alarm over Possible Space Wars, First Committee Delegates Explore Ways to Build New 
Order for Preventing Celestial Conflict, Confrontation, U.N. Press Release GA/DIS/3609 
(Oct. 24, 2018). 
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international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in 
outer space.”75 
Sadly, none of these diplomatic and multilateral efforts proved effective or 
lasting to divert away from the worrying trend of expanding space militarisa-
tion, possible space weaponization, and potential conflicts (wars) in space. 
Indeed, at the latest UNCOPUOS meeting in 2019, the view was expressed 
“that the absence of conflicts in space in the past could not be regarded as a 
guarantee of peace, in particular in an era in which new actors were entering 
the space arena.”76 Urgently needed are considerations of “ways and means 
of maintaining outer space for peaceful purposes and its consideration of the 
broader perspective of space security and associated matters that would be 
instrumental in ensuring the safe and responsible conduct of space activities 
. . . .”77 
V. WAYS AND MEANS OF MAINTAINING OUTER SPACE FOR PEACEFUL 
PURPOSES 
The lack of diplomatic will, and at times inability, to address issues related 
to space activities in general and matters of space security in particular, has 
resulted in repeated calls to find “ways and means of maintaining outer space 
for peaceful purposes” and addressing the broader issue of space security and 
the “the safe and responsible conduct of space activities.”78 Such efforts have 
been ongoing for at least two decades.79 Such efforts will invariably persist 
due to various diplomatic efforts (outlined above) that have been tried and 
tested without much avail. 
Though perspectives on the substantive means and ways of maintaining 
outer space for peaceful purposes differ,80 there is undeniable consensus that 
the international legal framework established by the UN space law treaties 
and resolutions must underpin all undertakings in the exploration and use of 
space, irrespective of whether such activities are civilian in nature or have a 
military or security bearing.81 
 
 75 G.A. Res. 72/250, ¶ 3 (Jan. 12, 2018). For the latest report, see U.N. Secretary-Gen-
eral, Group of Governmental Experts on Further Practical Measures for the Prevention of 
an Arms Race in Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/74/77 (Apr. 9, 2019). 
 76 Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines, supra note 11, at ¶ 54. 
 77 Id. at ¶ 42. 
 78 Press Release, Fourth Committee, Using Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes Can Con-
tribute to Implementation of Millennium Declaration, Chairman Says, As Fourth Commit-
tee Begins Debate, U.N. Press Release GA/SPD/321 (Oct. 17, 2005). 
 79 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 54/67, ¶ 29 (Feb. 11, 1999). 
 80 See generally Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal Sub-
comm. on Its Sixty-Second Session, U.N. Doc. A/74/20 (2019). 
 81 ICPUOS, supra note 57, at ¶ 5. 
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Presented below are two recent initiatives and, arguably, breakthroughs at 
the international level that serve to produce instruments to ensure that the gov-
ernance of outer space continues under the international rule of law and is 
driven by the interests of all of humankind. One initiative is the top-down 
diplomatic effort that resulted in the drafting and adoption of the UN Long-
term Sustainability Guidelines by the UNCOPUOS; the second is the civil 
society initiative in the drafting of the McGill Manual on International Law 
Applicable to Military Uses of Outer Space. 
VI. THE LONG-TERM SUSTAINABILITY GUIDELINES 
Writing at the dawn of the Space Age, Myres S. McDougal and Leon Lip-
son noted that the mode of the regulation of space activities cannot be “be 
charted with any precision.”82 Much of this is due to the very nature of the 
domain, which unlike any other, is an arena where military and non-military 
(civilian and commercial) interests and activities intercept and have always 
been intertwined. 
Even so, by and large the governance of outer space has gone through 
phases that last approximately two decades,83 beginning with the multilateral 
treaty process and adoption of the five UN space law treaties from the 1960s 
to the 1980s, which was followed up with the advent of UN principles dealing 
with specific technical applications of space from the 1980s to the 2000s.84 
The 2000s to date have been marked by the adoption of General Assembly 
resolutions and guidelines on matters such as TCBMs and the prevention of 
an arms race in outer space outlined in the previous section. The latest phase 
culminated with the rare and historic adoption of the Guidelines for the Long-
term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities of the Committee on the Peace-
ful Uses of Outer Space (Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines).85 
 
 82 Myres S. McDougal & Leon Lipson, Perspectives for a Law of Outer Space, 52 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 407, 430 (1958). 
 83 This was highlighted by Mr. Niklas Hedman, Chief Policy & Legal Affairs section of 
the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, at the APSCO TUBITAK UZAY Space 
Law Training Course, 18–21 September 2019, Istanbul, Turkey. Niklas Hedman, Chief 
Policy & Legal Affairs, United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Lecture at the 
APSCO TUBITAK UZAY Space Law Training Course, in Istanbul, Turkey (Sept. 2019). 
 84 See G.A. Res. 37/92, supra note 25; G.A. Res. 41/65, supra note 25; G.A. Res. 47/68, 
supra note 25; G.A. Res. 62/101 (Dec. 17, 2007); Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm. on Its Sixty-Second Session, U.N. Doc. A/62/20 
(2007); G.A. Res. 68/74 (Dec. 11, 2013). 
 85 Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines, supra note 11, at 50. 
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The Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines were adopted by consensus as a 
result of close to a decade of intense discussions86 on a set of voluntary guide-
lines for space actors to ensure space: 
remain[s] an operationally stable and safe environment that is 
maintained for peaceful purposes and open for exploration, use 
and international cooperation by current and future genera-
tions, in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree 
of economic or scientific development, without discrimination 
of any kind and with due regard for the principle of equity.87 
The Guidelines have been hailed as a breakthrough in international trans-
parency and norm-building. For the first time since the adoption of the Moon 
Agreement four decades ago, there is now a compendium of internationally 
agreed measures and practices to ensure the long-term sustainability of space 
activities and to enhance the safety of space operations. Integral to the Guide-
lines is fulfilling the objectives of the Declaration of Legal Principles and 
Outer Space Treaty to ensure that outer space can be explored and used by 
current and future generations for peaceful purposes and in the interest of all 
humankind.88 Underpinning the Guidelines is the consensus that the explora-
tion and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, 
remains “the province of all (hu)mankind,”89 and that activities of States in 
outer space be carried out in accordance with international law, including the 
Charter of the United Nations, thus affirming the principles contained in Ar-
ticle III of the Outer Space Treaty. 90 
The Guidelines address a number of policy, regulatory, operational, tech-
nical and capacity-building aspects of space activities,91 and apply to ongoing 
or planned activities conducted by States, international organizations or non-
governmental entities.92 The Guidelines are drafted in way that make them 
relevant “to all phases of a space mission, including launch, operation and 
end-of-life disposal.”93 
To date, there have been twenty-one guidelines adopted on, among other 
matter, enhancing the national regulation and supervision of national space 
 
 86 See generally Peter Martinez, Development of an International Compendium of 
Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, 43 SPACE POL’Y 13 
(2018). 
 87 Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines, supra note 11, at 50 ¶ 4. 
 88 Id. at 50–51 ¶ 5. 
 89 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 16, at art. I; Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines, 
supra note 11, at 51 ¶ 8. 
 90 Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines, supra note 11, at 51 ¶ 7. 
 91 Id. at 51 ¶ 11. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
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activities,94 improving the timely practice of registration,95 and enhancing the 
safety of space operations,96 especially information exchange on space objects 
and events.97 There are further guidelines on enhancing the sharing of space 
debris monitoring information,98 sharing space weather data and forecasts and 
developing space weather models,99 and for promoting and supporting infor-
mation exchange and capacity-building.100 Seven guidelines, pertaining to 
more politically sensitive and divisive issues, such as the commitment to con-
ducting space activities solely “for peaceful purposes”101 and measures to 
identify and mitigate risks to terrestrial infrastructure that support space oper-
ations,102 are to be discussed further with the aim of reaching international 
consensus in the years to come. 
While laudable, the Guidelines are exactly as the name suggests: guide-
lines that are to be implemented “to the greatest extent feasible and practica-
ble” and according to the “respective needs, conditions and capabilities” of 
the states or international organizations concerned.103 Thus, the Guidelines are 
“voluntary and not legally binding under international law.”104 Further, it is 
expressly stated that the Guidelines do not “constitute a revision, qualification 
or reinterpretation of [applicable international law] principles and norms,”105 
which may undermine their status and value. 
However, it must be recognized that even if states and international organ-
izations voluntarily implement or refer to the Guidelines, the international 
community may see greater convergence of practices and the adoption of reg-
ulations and policies in line with the Guidelines. Such convergent practices, 
and the adoption of regulations and policies that are inspired by the Guide-
lines, may support the emergence of general practice that is “sufficiently wide-
spread and representative, as well as consistent.”106 Such general practice 
 
 94 Id. at § II (A)(1)–(3), at 54–56. 
 95 Id. at § II (A)(5), at 57–59. 
 96 Id. at § II (B), at 59–66. 
 97 Id. at § II (B)(2)–(5), at 60–62. 
 98 Id. at § II (B)(3), at 60; see also id. § II (B)(8), at 64. 
 99 Id. § II (B)(6)–(7), at 62–64. 
 100 Id. § II (C)(1)–(4), at 66–68. 
 101 Survey of the Problem of Discretion, supra note 45, at ¶ 7. 
 102 Id. at 4, §§ 18–19. 
 103 Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines, supra note 11, at ¶ 16. 
 104 Id. at ¶ 15. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/71/10, 
at 77 (2016). 
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need not be “absolutely rigorous,”107 and may go a long way to creating prac-
tice that may eventually be valuable in the identification of custom.108 
VII. THE MILAMOS PROJECT 
As alluded to earlier, though space activities must be conducted in accord-
ance with the international rule of law, obviously not all international law 
would apply to space activities.109 As Lachs noted, many domains of interna-
tional law would acquire a “new dimension” in regulating the conduct of states 
in outer space and would therefore warrant “a more extensive interpreta-
tion.”110 Again, the Russian Federation described the problem succinctly and 
underlined that “analysis or characterization by a State of another State’s be-
haviour most often does not reflect the manner in which that State judges its 
own behaviour of essentially the same kind. Such double standards may result 
in a situation where events develop according to a threatening scenario.”111 
Thus, there is a need to objectively clarify the rules of international law appli-
cable to military space activities conducted during peacetime, including in 
times posing challenges to peace.112 
The implications of certain activities that interfere with the rights of other 
States may lead to internationally wrongful acts and warrant different re-
sponses that,113 in order to ensure sustainable, responsible and peaceful use of 
 
 107 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. V. U.S.), Judge-
ment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 186 (June 27). 
 108 For more on the elements of custom, see Ram Jakhu et al., The Sources of Interna-
tional Space Law: Revisited, 67 J. AIR & SPACE L. 606, 623 (2018). As Daniel Thurer 
describes it, soft law instruments, such as the Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines, repre-
sent “a complex of norms lacking binding force, but producing significant legal effects 
nevertheless.” Daniel Thurer, Soft Law, ¶ 37, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009); see also Steven Freeland, The Role of ‘Soft Law’ in Public 
International Law and Its Relevance to the International Legal Regulation of Outer Space, 
in SOFT LAW IN OUTER SPACE: THE FUNCTION OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL 
SPACE LAW 9–30 (2012); Jean-Francois Mayence, The European Union’s Initiative for a 
code of Conduct on Space Activities: A Model of Soft Law for Outer Space?, in SOFT LAW 
IN OUTER SPACE: THE FUNCTION OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 
343 (2012). 
 109 There may be some rules that do not apply, such as lex specialis rules that govern 
“specific environments.” See LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, supra note 13, at 13. 
 110 Id. at 14. 
 111 Survey of the Problem of Discretion, supra note 45, at ¶ 15. 
 112 The vision of the MILAMOS Project is to “develop, within a period of three years, a 
manual that objectively articulates and clarifies existing international law applicable to 
military uses of outer space in time of peace, including challenges to peace.” See Manual 
on International Law Applicable to Military Uses of Outer Space, MCGILL, https://www.m 
cgill.ca/milamos/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2020). 
 113 Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, pt. 2, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 
678 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 48:661 
outer space, may well differ according to the circumstances and the severity 
of the interference. The maintenance of international peace and security, on 
Earth as well as in space, must distinguish between what the International 
Court of Justice held in Nicaragua are “the most grave forms of the use of 
force (those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave forms.”114 
The Articles on State Responsibility, codified by the International Law 
Commission and adopted by the U.N. General Assembly,115 confirm that the 
international legal regime is governed by a framework to adjudge the respon-
sibility of States for wrongful acts116 and describe circumstances when wrong-
fulness can be precluded,117 such as in the event of necessity118 or self-de-
fence.119 Countermeasures may be taken, also in the space context, as long as 
it is in accordance with international law and the UN Charter to refrain from 
the threat or use of force,120 and so far as the countermeasure is commensurate 
to the injury suffered and subject to other conditions considering the gravity 
of the triggering wrongful act and rights affected.121 
By capturing the applicable customary law in black-letter rules and provid-
ing evidence of State practice and opinio juris to support the existence of such 
customary norms, manuals have historically proven useful to reach interna-
tional consensus on the legality of activities in domains on which “an interna-
tional treaty, which might perhaps be premature or at least very difficult to 
obtain.”122 The space domain, particularly in relation to discussing and reach-
ing consensus on the rules surrounding military space activities and activities 
that have implications for space security, is a realm of regulation that is well-
suited for the manual process. 
 
(2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 32, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter Articles on State Responsibility]. 
 114 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judg-
ment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 191 (June 27); see also Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. 
U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 64 (Nov 6). 
 115 G.A. Res. 56/83, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Jan. 28, 
2002). 
 116 An international, wrongful act must be: i) attributable to the State under international 
law; and ii) constitute the breach of an international obligation of the State. See Articles on 
State Responsibility, supra note 113, at art. 2. 
 117 See id. 
 118 Id. at art. 25. 
 119 Id. at art. 21. 
 120 UN Charter art. 2, ¶ 4; see also Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 113, at art. 
50(1)(a). 
 121 See generally Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 113, at ch. II; see also Sur-
vey of the Problem of Discretion, supra note 45, at ¶ 10. 
 122 THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS, 
AND OTHER DOCUMENTS, Preface (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 1988). 
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The contribution and value of manuals have moreover been affirmed on 
occasions by international courts and tribunals,123 with the International Crim-
inal Court deeming manuals as “provid[ing] the most useful guidance on the 
applicable law,” and as providing the “useful expression of the crystallisation” 
of the law.124 There have been various non-governmental efforts to objectively 
clarify the application of the law in the other frontiers. The process and suc-
cess of the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Con-
flict at Sea,125 the Harvard Manual on International Law Applicable to Air 
and Missile Warfare,126 and the Tallinn Manual on International Law Appli-
cable to Cyber Warfare127 demonstrate how international experts and engage-
ment with governments can produce non-official interpretation and clarifica-
tion of the law while avoiding many of the challenges inherent in multilateral 
negotiations among states. Though these manuals deal with the application of 
the law of armed conflict or warfare in particular domains, it must be under-
lined that “manuals today do not limit their coverage just to the law of armed 
conflict.”128 
The McGill Manual is the first of its kind to address the legality of a range 
of issues that have a bearing on military activities in outer space. Doing so 
will contribute to the progressive development of international law and foster 
international peace and security and the sustainability of outer space, which is 
in the interest of all States, and is indeed a goal of all humanity. 
Launched in May 2016, and having gathered the involvement of dozens of 
legal and technical subject-matter experts from institutions across the 
globe,129 the MILAMOS Project crucially defines the legality and scope of 
responsible behavior in situations that fall short of armed conflict. The 
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 124 IN’TL CRIMINAL COURT, OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, SITUATION ON REGISTERED 
VESSELS OF COMOROS, GREECE AND CAMBODIA: ARTICLE 53(1) REPORT  ¶ 31 (2014), https: 
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MILAMOS Project also explains the legal consequences that exist for states 
that breach their international obligations toward other states and the interna-
tional community as a whole. Such a manual is essential in clarifying how 
international legal principles and norms such as interference, intervention, and 
the threat or use of force apply in outer space or to space activities, so as to 
avoid unilateral interpretations of the law and reduce the risk of “mispercep-
tion, misinformation, misunderstanding and miscalculation arising from mil-
itary activities in outer space.”130 Such clear statements and interpretations of 
the law by neutral experts will be crucial to ensure that all space activities, 
conducted by a State or space operator, are conducted in accordance with fun-
damental tenets of international law. 
Acknowledgement by States and international experts in the legal domain 
of these fundamental concepts amount to a significant transparency and con-
fidence-building measure, which would in turn help to reduce the likelihood 
of conflict in space. The successful completion of a manual with the input of 
eminent authors, experts and recognized stakeholders in space activities will 
provide states and space operators with clear statements and objective inter-
pretations of the law as it is (lex lata). 
To date, the MILAMOS Project has gathered international renown and has 
been presented at various venues across the globe. More recently, in June 
2018, at the symposium organized to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the first 
United Nations Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(UNISPACE+50), the MILAMOS Project was highlighted as a prime exam-
ple of the role that civil society institutions can play to bring together various 
actors and stakeholders involved in the exploration and use of outer space and 
foster dialogue and consensus on challenging issues pertaining to space 
law.131 Reflecting the remarkable standing of the MILAMOS Project, in Oc-
tober 2018 the rule-drafting and consensus-forming process, the latest devel-
opments, and progress surrounding the work of the Manual were presented to 
the delegates of the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly 
and of the United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(UNCOPUOS).132 In September 2019, the MILAMOS Project was presented 
at the Second United Nations Conference on Space Law and Policy as a viable 
means to strengthen the long-term use and sustainability of outer space.133 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
At the adoption of the Outer Space Treaty in 1967, then-U.S. President 
Lyndon Johnson famously declared that “[n]o one may use outer space or ce-
lestial bodies to begin a war.”134 Noting the “successful identification of com-
mon interests and their expression in a mutually acceptable legal instru-
ment”135 that was concluded in “remarkably short time,”136 then-Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk underlined the Treaty’s success “in substantial measure in 
establishing the necessary standards for reducing the dangers of military con-
flict in outer space” and the necessity of cooperation if “the world is going to 
escape destruction by conflict.”137 These words ring true over half a century 
since the adoption of the single most crucial international instrument that has 
prevented conflict in space. 
As one person succinctly highlighted at the UNCOPUOS, the “absence of 
conflicts in space in the past could not be regarded as a guarantee of peace.”138 
Though military and strategic interests have been integral to the exploration 
and use of outer space from the very beginning, the ICRC has unequivocally 
stated that as with any new means or methods of warfare, “the weaponization 
of outer space is not inevitable but is a choice” that would increase the prob-
ability of armed conflict in outer space.139 Due to the devastating conse-
quences and humanitarian implications of an armed conflict in space, all states 
that are reliant on the space infrastructure must avoid further weaponization 
and trends that increase the likelihood of conflict. Indeed, the choice to fight 
a war in space is one that even the United States,140 and all other States, do 
not wish to engage in for “no one wins if war extends into space.”141 
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In light of the inability to reach binding international agreement to secure 
space security and set ground rules for the military uses of outer space, the 
UN Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines and the MILAMOS Project pre-
sented in this Article are innovative and viable ways and means which will go 
a long way to strengthen the responsible and peaceful use of outer space. 
 
